Abstract This paper analyzes potential criteria to allocate international funding for adaptation to climate change, as a response to one of the main governance challenges of international adaptation funding-the prioritization of project proposals given scarce funding. Based on the review of the equity and cost-effectiveness literature and relevant policy documents, we identify three potential indicators for equity (vulnerability level, poverty, equal funding per capita), and three indicators for cost-effectiveness (economic savings in absolute and relative terms, human lives saved). Applying these simple indicators to information provided in all 39 project documents considered by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) in 2011, we find that projects approved or endorsed by the AFB rank high according to one cost-effectiveness indicator (absolute economic savings), while they rather rank low according to all equity and further cost-effectiveness indicators. Furthermore, we analyze whether equity and cost-effectiveness are two contradicting goals, or whether ways can be found to reconcile both goals in multilateral adaptation finance. We conclude from both the theory and the 39 analyzed project documents that a pure economic definition of cost-effectiveness tends to be in contradiction with equity but that trade-offs between equity and cost-effectiveness can be limited if relative economic savings or human live savings are used as indicator for cost-effectiveness.
for eligible projects exceed the amount of available funding (AFB 2012d) . Using the firstcome-first-serve criterion for allocation of funding, as currently applied, will become more and more questionable, given that this will provide an incentive to submit proposals as early as possible. This paper considers which criteria could be used for prioritization.
In the literature on adaptation funding, we find primarily a discussion of two potential goals or normative criteria: 1 first, equity or fairness, that is, the equitable and fair treatment of countries and persons (e.g. Thomas and Twyman 2005; Paavola and Adger 2006; Dellink et al. 2009) , and second, cost-effectiveness or efficiency, that is, the generation of the maximum benefit for a given level of resources (e.g. Mendelsohn 2000; Fankhauser and Burton 2011; Stadelmann et al. 2011; UNFCCC 2010b) . To date, only a few accounts have discussed efficiency and equity together as principles for adaptation funding. Füssel (2011) and Füssel et al. (2012) take note of the dilemma of reconciling both efficiency and equity goals when resources are scarce. Grasso (2010) discusses both procedural and distributive justice aspects of adaptation funding and recognizes conflicts. Füssel et al. (2012) propose that selected indicators could inform the political decision of allocation, but provide no empirical analysis of possible outcomes. Finally, no paper has analyzed whether efficiency and equity are really contradictory or rather complementary principles, which is an open debate in other policy fields (see e.g. Okun 1975; Le Grand 1990; Blank 2002; Dietz and Atkinson 2010) .
Therefore, this paper assesses potential indicators for both equity and cost-effectiveness, and how they could be useful as criteria for prioritization of adaptation funding. Moreover, we analyze whether equity and cost-effectiveness are contradictory principles and, therefore, policymakers will face trade-offs if they want to prioritize adaptation projects considering both goals. We conduct our analysis on both a theoretical and an empirical level. In the empirical part, we analyze data from the AF as major multilateral funding institution. We use all 39 adaptation funding project proposals from the year 2011 to analyze how well project proposals approved and endorsed by the AFB score according to equity and cost-effectiveness indicators, when compared to project proposals that were not approved or endorsed. Furthermore, we assess whether aiming at both equity and cost-effectiveness would have created trade-offs in case of the 39 projects.
Methodology and selection of data
Each of the following chapters will have the same structure: review of the literature, review of relevant AFB documents, definition of indicators and, finally, analysis of concrete AF projects.
For the last step, we analyze all 39 project documents considered by the AFB in 2011.
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Among these 39 project documents, 23 were full proposals and 16 were earlier stage project concepts. The AFB approved 57 % of the full proposals and endorsed 63 % of the concepts, while the rest was either not approved (full proposals) or not endorsed (concepts), see Table 1 . The project documents were downloaded from the ''AFB meeting documents'' section on the AFB (2012c) webpage. A full list of projects in the sample, with implementing agencies, information on status (concept or full proposal) and requested funding is provided in the Supplementary Material, Table 1 .
Equity when allocating Adaptation Fund resources
Equity as a principle for allocating scarce funds is difficult to operationalize. An additional complication in the case of the AF is the fact that we are dealing with equity, or distributive justice, 3 at two levels, between countries and between projects. We return to this issue below, but first we review alternative interpretations of equity in the theoretical literature.
The relational property of equity has been captured in social psychology, primarily equity theory as developed by Adams (1965) . This theory understands equity as distribution of resources perceived as fair by both relational partners. It posits that an individual will consider he/she is fairly treated when the following condition holds:
Translating this theory to the adaptation finance context, we could consider developing countries eligible for adaptation finance as ''individuals'' in this case. Having a common pool of resources to share, they would arguably only perceive the allocation of funds 4 (outcomes) as equitable in case it is uniformly proportional to some condition (input). In the case of the AF, this condition is most often thought of as level of vulnerability (Klein 2009; Klein and Möhner 2011; Horstmann 2011) . 5 We shall see below that the operationalization and measurement of level of vulnerability is the most common problem when applying equity principles and has challenged the AFB.
Approaching equity from a normative rather than positive perspective, some alternative principles have been developed in political theory. Duus-Otterström and Stripple (2011) review three alternative principles of justice in relation to allocating adaptation finance, 3 Equity may not only refer to fair distribution of resources but also to fair procedures (Leventhal 1980; Adger et al. 2007 ). However, we focus on distributive justice in this paper. 4 One could also see ''increased utility'' and not ''allocation of funds'' as outcome. For simplicity, we assume a linear relation here. 5 The primacy of vulnerability as the basis for allocating funds can be seen in the decision 1/CMP.3 establishing the Adaptation Fund (UNFCCC 2008) , where ''particular vulnerability'' is defined as the key eligibility criterion for developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol to receive funds. Vulnerability is further mentioned in other COP decisions, and ''level of vulnerability'' stated as the first in a series of variables that should be taken into account when allocation decisions are made, according to the Strategicwhich we consider here at the level of countries rather than projects or individuals. First, equality, if referring to (1) equal funds to all countries, would not change current inequity. If referring to (2) an allocation so that all countries become equally (in)vulnerable, it is seen as unrealistically costly, or flawed in that it could be interpreted as, in principle, allowing for a ''levelling-up'' 6 of vulnerability. A more realistic approach than making countries equally (in)vulnerable could be to reduce the inequality in vulnerability. Ratajczak-Juszko and Feaver (2011) propose an approach for the AF that would disburse funding proportional to ''net vulnerability,'' which is directly related to ''need'' (vulnerability) and inversely related to ''capacity'' (adaptive capacity).
Second, the leximin principle (Paavola and Adger 2006; see also Kolm 1996) avoids the ''levelling-up'' problem, by stipulating a stepwise move down the vulnerability ladder; resources are first allocated so that the worst off becomes as well off as the second-to-worst off, and if resources remain, as well off as the third-to-worst off, etc. Vulnerability would thus be the currency also for applying this principle. Duus-Otterström and Stripple claim that this principle, while appealing, would be prohibitively resource demanding. Arguably, though, this depends on the choice of vulnerability indicator/index and the incidence of countries on that scale. Existing indices (see below) suggest that country scores are relatively dispersed, which means that the initial steps up the ladder need not be prohibitively costly, in principle.
The third candidate principle reviewed by Duus-Otterström and Stripple (2011) is utilitarianism, which stipulates the maximization of utility or ''happiness'' as moral criterion for governing the society (Mill 1863) , a principle that has become the foundation of ''economic efficiency.'' As commonly criticized (see e.g. Parfit 1997), it does not distinguish between benefits accruing to the most vulnerable and those accruing to less vulnerable actors and is therefore often seen as inequitable. Furthermore, utility is often measured by willingness to pay, which means that benefits of poorer and, therefore, often more vulnerable countries are underrepresented. In theory, this could be addressed, however, through weighting of benefits according to some external assessment of vulnerability of countries or communities.
Clearly, all principles rely on the currency of vulnerability, and the same operationalization and measurement challenges are faced. The construction of vulnerability indicators or indices, measured at national or sub-national levels, has been strongly contested in the academic community. For example, Hinkel (2011) and Klein (2009) argue that vulnerability is a too complex and subjective phenomenon to lend itself to ''measurement'' across countries, and that it is a political rather than scientific task. Füssel (2010) and Füssel et al. (2012) find a generic index not appropriate, while sector-or hazard-specific criteria could help guide funding allocation. In order to move from such sector-specific to more aggregate indicators political decisions would be required. While such political decisions were achieved in case of mitigation, where policy makers, for example, agreed on Global Warming Potentials, the agreement on and measurement of vulnerability is much more complex, as it involves many ethical dimensions (e.g. time, uncertainty, social versus economic benefits).
Researchers have proposed country indices for vulnerability and adaptive capacity (Buys et al. 2009; Barr et al. 2010; Global Adaptation Institute 2011; Wheeler 2011) . Comparing these indices for ''impact vulnerability,'' they all include change in agricultural yield and exposure to sea level rise, whereas only two include health impacts and population sensitivity to disasters. In addition to their impact vulnerability index, Barr et al. (2010) have also developed an ''adaptive capacity'' index, which includes six indicators related to age structure of the population, access to credit, income inequality, governance, literacy and education rates. As further challenge when allocating funding, these vulnerability indices have been calculated only at a country level. In relation to the issue of the two levels with which the AF is concerned, national level and project level, it is unclear whether the observed variation between country scores is higher or lower than variation between regions within a country.
The second major problem is thus whether the AF should aim for equity among countries, or should it aim for equity among projects or sub-national entities? The principles above assume that there is only one type of worthy recipient to be compared (for example, countries) rather than two types, or levels, or recipients (for example, countries and sub-national projects).
Given these major challenges-various equity definitions, vulnerability indices and two levels-which equity-related principles have the AFB used so far? Starting from the eligibility criteria on the country level, see Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997) and Decision 10 at the Marrakesh conference (UNFCCC 2002), specific considerations are to be made when allocating resources among eligible countries, see Article 16 of the Operation Guidelines (AFB 2010b). Among these criteria, three are clearly equity related:
7 ''(a) Level of vulnerability […] and (c) Ensuring access to the fund in a balanced and equitable manner. '' In relation to the first equity-related principle, ''level of vulnerability,'' so far, the AFB has chosen not to define vulnerability more precisely, including operationalizing it into indicators or an index. The issue has been discussed at several meetings. In June 2010, the AFB concluded that ''no one measure could be applied and the vulnerability of a country had to be determined by each country itself'' (AFB 2010a). Horstmann (2011) argues that it is unlikely that the AFB members would adopt a more precise definition which may exclude countries in their constituencies and that the current situation where it is up to the country itself to interpret vulnerability is actually in line with the country-driven approach, another principle stipulated for the AF. In the absence of a standard methodology, it is thus not clear whether or how the AFB applies the ''particular vulnerability'' (binary category) or ''level of vulnerability'' (interval) criteria. The problem is further confounded by the fact that the review process and its documentation have not been open to the public until recently.
The second equity-related principle stipulated for the AF is ''access to the fund in a balanced and equitable manner for eligible countries,'' see decision 5/CMP.2 (UNFCCC 2007). This principle has been operationalized to some extent. A document on ''initial funding priorities'' was under discussion in the AFB for a considerable amount of time. An interim version considered regions, Least Developed Country (LDC) or Small Island Developing State (SIDS) status and the status as Official Development Assistance recipient as criteria to decide on the allocation of funds. In the end, a uniform cap of US dollars (USD) 10 million per country was set (AFB 2011b). This principle is a weak version of the equity principle ''equality,'' in the sense that all eligible entities have the same maximum amount of resources available.
Finally, the strategic priorities of the AF state that ''special attention shall be given by eligible Parties to the particular needs of the most vulnerable communities'' (UNFCCC 2009). This ''priority'' addresses sub-national equity in some sense, but is clearly not a requirement to demonstrate that the project will benefit the most vulnerable community in a particular country. Nor does it give any guidance on how community-level vulnerability should be compared across countries.
Against this background of theory and AFB practices, we formulate here a series of simple and operational equity indicators to demonstrate how they correspond with funding decisions actually taken. Note that these are not ''objective'' indicators of equity-equity indicators will always involve some subjective valuation-but indicators that correspond well to concepts in the literature. We describe how they apply to the level of countries and/ or individuals.
Our first indicator is equal funding per capita, which is a proxy for equality between individuals. This indicator is inspired by the equality principle in the literature (cf. Füssel et al. 2012 ) and the equitable access criteria in the AF review criteria. It is based on the assumption that each vulnerable person should have equal access to funding. On a country basis, it would clearly benefit more populated countries in absolute terms.
8 Given the small AF funding compared to the billions of vulnerable persons, we can measure the extent to which equal funding per capita is met with the number of beneficiaries reached by a project as contained in the project documents. Maximizing the number of beneficiaries can be contested on several grounds, for example, a tendency to spread out resources so thinly that there will not be any significant benefit, potential mismatch between number of beneficiaries and real benefits, or the low data quality on beneficiaries. Still, equal funding per capita is closer to vulnerability than equal funding per country, the other interpretation of equality in the Adaptation Fund context.
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Our second indicator is support for the most vulnerable, in that more vulnerable countries should have priority access to the Adaptation Fund. This principle is inspired by the equality (achieving equality of vulnerability) and leximin (support to the most vulnerable first) principles above. Strict application of these is not possible due to the time lag in observing vulnerability and the fact that the national cap of USD10 million prohibits differentiation of grants awarded. We measure this indicator by taking the vulnerability index of Barr et al. (2010) as an example and by doing a sensitivity analysis by applying three other indices (Buys et al. 2009; Global Adaptation Institute 2011; Wheeler 2011) . Using vulnerability indices generates several problems. First, these indices do not cover all eligible countries; the Barr index covers at least all but one country in our sample. Second, the variation in country rankings on the three vulnerability indices suggests that they are indeed sensitive to choice of indicator and data used. Third, the vulnerability indices are very difficult to understand for the general public and even policymakers, as most of them are composed of several sub-indicators.
Given these challenges of vulnerability indices, we also use support for the poorest countries as a third indicator, measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, assuming that allocating funding to the poorest countries will reduce inequality. While GDP per capita indicator falls short of including all relevant assets of individuals and is also a sub-optimal proxy for climate vulnerability, it is considered relevant here as a simple, well understandable indicator for poverty and low development, which is relevant in the AFB context where LDC status has been discussed as a basis for priority access (AFB 2011b). Table 2 shows which projects considered by the AFB in 2011 would have to be selected according to the three equity indicator. Some projects are consistently among the 10-15 highest (e.g. Mali, Mauritania, and Tanzania) or lowest ranked projects (e.g. Argentina, Belize, Cook Islands, Mauritius, and Uruguay), while others have more ambiguous rankings.
Has the AFB rather approved and endorsed projects that the three equity indicators would suggest for funding? It seems the opposite has happened. The Spearman's rankordered correlation coefficient between funding approval/endorsement and equity principles (Table 3) shows that the AFB has, at least in 2011, rather selected projects in countries with low vulnerability, high income per capita, and a low number of beneficiaries. However, the sample is small, so the negative correlations are not significant or only at the 10 % level. The negative correlation between vulnerability and approval (or endorsement) does not depend on the index chosen; according to all indices, the AFB has rather selected projects in countries with low vulnerability (see Supplementary Material, Table 3 ). The negative relationship is both evident in case of project concepts and full proposals. These results suggest that allocation of funding in this sample of proposals was rather inequitable, both in respect to level of vulnerability and poverty, and unequal in respect to equal funding per capita.
This equity analysis has severe limitations. Apart from the selection of equity indicators, which imply important value judgements, we have a general limitation connected to the level of analysis: the indicators applied are on a national level but it would be relevant here to capture the issue of sub-national equity, considering that allocation is primarily made to projects rather than countries and that attention should be paid to the needs of ''most vulnerable communities.'' Note that comparison of projects, based on the vulnerability of the targeted communities, within a country is in a sense delegated to the national governments of AF eligible countries, who are effectively responsible for making sure that the national cap is used in the best way.
Cost-effectiveness when allocating Adaptation Fund resources
Cost-effectiveness is a measure for the extent to which a policy can achieve an objective per unit of social costs-a common policy indicator in the climate change mitigation field (Gupta et al. 2007 ). Like its mitigation counterpart, also adaptation policy has to correctly assess costs but the real challenge lies in the determination of the ''effectiveness'' part, for two reasons.
The first challenge in assessing ''effectiveness'' is that uncertainty prevails in climate change's impact on humans and ecosystems at the regional and local level (Parry et al. 2007 (Parry et al. , 2009 ) as well as the benefits of adaptation measures (Adger et al. 2007 ). This means that some interventions may prove to be more or less beneficial than anticipated, or a measure may even have a negative impact, implying ''maladaptation'' (Barnett and O'Neill 2010) . Therefore, flexible approaches and soft measures with long-term benefits may be most appropriate for adaptation (Hallegatte 2009; Fankhauser and Burton 2011) . Unfortunately, the benefits of soft and flexible interventions are difficult to predict. The second issue is that ''effectiveness'' indicators for adaptation have not yet been agreed (Adger et al. 2007; UNFCCC 2010a) . Typically, the avoided climate impacts are quantified both in economic terms (e.g. Tol et al. 1998) or non-monetary terms such as crop yields (e.g. Lobell et al. 2008) , exposed population or health (e.g. Costello et al. 2009 ). Given the missing agreement on cost-effectiveness measurement in the academic literature, political definitions in AFB documents may help. The AFB (2010c) has, similar to other development agencies, set up a result framework, where it defines desired outputs, outcomes, impact, and goal of adaptation interventions. The reasoning is that immediate project outputs should lead to short-and mid-term outcomes and finally to impacts and achievement of the goal. Given that outputs (e.g. trained people) and outcomes (e.g. built dams) are intermediary results, the result-level ultimately of interest for measuring costeffectiveness is the ''impact.'' The AFB has very vaguely defined the desired impact as ''increased resiliency at the community, national, and regional levels to climate variability and change'' without further defining an indicator. Also, the goal of the AFB interventions does not reveal more than the focus on particularly vulnerable countries (AFB 2010c).
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The AFB project proposal form (AFB 2012e) and the project review criteria (AFB 2012a) are even less specific by mentioning ''Does the project provide economic, social, and environmental benefits, with particular reference to the most vulnerable communities?'' and ''Is the project cost-effective?'' These very generic sentences have led to a very heterogeneous way of describing cost-effectiveness in the 39 projects assessed in 2011.
We understand cost-effectiveness of adaptation projects, here, in terms of the ultimate effect of AFB projects per USD invested, to improve people's well-being by helping them to cope with climate change. Therefore, we are not primarily interested in intermediate outcomes (e.g. capacity building, regulatory change) of AFB projects themselves but in their ultimate contribution to improve well-being of persons and countries.
As neither the academic literature nor AFB policy documents have been clear which indicator captures cost-effectiveness of interventions, we will rely on a set of three indicators that try to proxy cost-effectiveness: absolute economic savings, relative economic savings, and human lives saved per USD of spending. While the choice of these three indicators involve value judgments and simplify the overall set of potential adaptive benefits, 11 we can argue that they reflect the most important features in both the literature (monetary and non-monetary benefits) and the AFB documents (vulnerability; economic and social benefits), as we will explain in the following.
The first indicator is Economic saving (absolute), defined as the monetized assets saved by adaptation interventions. Economic savings reflect economic value as the standard Barr et al. 2010 IMF (2011 indicator used by economists to conduct cost-benefit analysis of adaptation interventions ECAWG 2009; Moench et al. 2009 ). It also represents the ''economic benefits'' demanded in the AFB's project review criteria (AFB 2012a). The philosophical background of measuring benefits through monetary terms is the stipulation in utilitarianism that maximizing the sum of personal utilities is the desirable social goal, while utility can be measured by willingness to pay. Using economic savings as the only indicator for cost-effectiveness would have two major drawbacks: first, non-monetized benefits, including some of the social and environmental benefits asked for by the AFB (2012b) would not be included. Second, willingness to pay is dependent on the existing wealth level, so absolute economic savings will probably favor countries with high income and high capacity to adapt and, therefore, are not representing the most vulnerable countries. Therefore, two further indicators are used for measuring cost-effectiveness: economic savings (relative) and human live savings.
12 Economic savings (relative) are defined as the percentage of annual income saved, multiplied with the number of beneficiaries. This indicator can be used as a proxy for reducing vulnerability as AFB funding will have a higher impact on relative wealth in less-affluent countries with a more vulnerable population.
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Human lives savings are measured in Disability Adjusted Life Years Saved (DALYs), an indicator systematically utilized by the World Health Organization (WHO 2010). The DALY indicator avoids the ethically challenging monetization of saved lives, which has sparked intensive debate in the past . Already Fearnside (1998) suggested separating human lives and property values when assessing climate change impacts. Furthermore, human lives savings may be a good proxy for reduced vulnerability, and it does not differ between lives of rich and poor persons.
Applying these indicators, absolute and relative economic savings and human live savings, to our sample of 39 AFB project proposals (see Table 4 ), we see that the costeffectiveness indicators are not always contradictory as some projects perform very well according to several indicators, for example, the Solomon Islands project leads the economic ranking, both in absolute and in relative terms, while the Ecuador project tops the 12 We use these two as indicators in addition to the absolute economics savings indicator and not as replacement, as absolute economic value has its one merits: it is the usual way to measure macro-economic effectiveness, it is a standard indicator for evaluating the well-being of societies, it reflects overall utility as stated by market participants, and, finally, vulnerable people may benefit from absolute economic assets via re-distribution. 13 An absolute wealth assessment treats USD100 of wealth increase for a millionaire and a subsistence farmer the same, while a relative assessment captures the relative importance of assets for coping with climate change much better.
Equity and cost-effectiveness 111 ''human lives saved'' ranking and ranks second in absolute economic terms. Unfortunately, most project documents do not include data on human lives and absolute economic benefits, and only refer to number of beneficiaries, from which approximate relative economic savings were derived. 14 Therefore, the most informative ranking, based on the data we have, 15 can be made on the relative economic indicator. Obviously, the rankings depend on information provided in the project proposals and thus different assumptions and models. More reliable numbers would be based on common calculation methodologies or models, which are not available in case of the AF. Therefore, the ranking presented here does not necessarily correspond to the real cost-effectiveness; it only presents the information that was available to AFB members at the point of decision making.
The correlation table (Table 5) indicates that the AFB has rather approved and endorsed project proposals with high absolute economic savings, while projects with high relative economic savings have been disadvantaged. The correlations of the human lives indicator rely on data from only one project, while other projects did not mention human live benefits in numbers, so it is not possible to make any general statement. In case of project concepts, the AFB has been indifferent to absolute economic savings, while it has clearly less endorsed projects with high relative savings. In case of full proposals, the AFB has clearly approved projects with high absolute economic savings while being rather indifferent to relative savings.
5 Equity and cost-effectiveness: are they friends or foes?
Traditionally, equity and cost-effectiveness 16 are seen as two principles or goals that are in contradiction and create trade-offs (Blank 2002) . Actually, there are two types of potential trade-offs between equity and cost-effectiveness (Le Grand 1990): a value trade-off, so human beings may value one principle as normatively important and the other not, and a production trade-off, so a social outcome may be favorable from the perspective of one principle but not from the other. We will focus on the production trade-off between equity and cost-effectiveness and examine whether specific outcomes of adaptation funding are equally favorable from an equity and cost-effectiveness point of view. While Okun (1975) argues that there are substantial production trade-offs between equity and cost-effectiveness, we may argue that multilateral adaptation funding could be a case where the trade-off is low: First, the costs of administration and behavioral change due to equity-related redistribution (Okun 1975) are less relevant in the AFB context, as multilateral adaptation funding is by its nature a redistributive procedure from the North to the South, 17 so all the mentioned costs of striving for equity may, at least partially, also occur if the AFB strives for cost-effectiveness. Moreover, adaptation funding incorporates at least two types of redistribution, for which Blank (2002) expects low trade-offs: ''transfers to populations with no capacity to change their behavior'' 18 and subsidies for ''commodities […] that function as long-term investments and create future income gains.'' In the adaptation case, several of such commodities with long-term benefits are subsidized (e.g. infrastructure investment, climate knowledge).
Finally, we may also question on a conceptual level whether equity and cost-effectiveness are necessarily contradictory in the context of multilateral adaptation funding. We have seen that many potential equity indicators somehow measure the ''vulnerability'' of countries. On the cost-effectiveness side, some indicators approximate ''the reduction in vulnerability'' to measure the effectiveness part of cost-effectiveness. Therefore, in many cases, the only difference between equity and cost-effectiveness is that equity indicators measure the potential for vulnerability reductions, while cost-effectiveness measures the actual vulnerability reduction achieved. In an extreme case, ''achieved reduction of vulnerability'' is both the equity and the cost-effectiveness indicator, 19 so there should not be any trade-off. This argument is similar to the one of Le Grand (1990) who argues that in some cases, there is only seemingly a trade-off because ''cost-effectiveness'' itself is not The level of trade-off will also certainly depend on the indicators chosen. Table 6 shows which pairs of indicators are likely to indicate trade-offs between equity and cost-effectiveness and which may indicate synergies. Starting with absolute economic savings as cost-effectiveness indicator, we may except likely trade-offs with all equity indicators: absolute economic savings will likely occur in wealthier countries with low vulnerability, high income per capita, and more USD needed to make one person benefit from a programme. The second cost-effectiveness indicator, relative economic savings, is likely to be in close correspondence with equity indicators. This is because relative wealth savings are more likely in poorer countries, which also tend to be more vulnerable (see correlations in Supplementary Material, Table 3 ).
20 Furthermore, as the relative savings indicator measures the number of personal livelihoods that can be saved, it should also be positively related to the number of beneficiaries. Finally, also in case of human live savings, we may rather expect synergies with equity indicators as poorer and vulnerable persons are more at (Eriksen and O'Brien 2007) , there is substantial overlap in practice as less-affluent people often suffer from wealth losses and have less capacity to recover (Kahn 2005; Eriksen and O'Brien 2007) .
Equity and cost-effectiveness 115 risk both regarding death and disability. As well, the number of beneficiaries should positively relate to the life years saved. Table 7 displays how well the theoretical relationships between indicators are reflected by our sample of 39 projects submitted to the AFB in 2011. In case of absolute economic savings, the expected trade-off with vulnerability and poverty of a country is occurring, although the negative coefficients are small. As well, consistent with our theoretical considerations, the relative economic savings do positively correlate with all equity indicators, and the positive correlations are highly significant. Finally, in case of human live benefits, we see an unexpected trade-off with poverty but this result should be cautiously interpreted as it mainly relies on human live savings mentioned by one project. Even when the sample size is small (N = 35) , 21 the correlations between relative economic savings and equity are significant. The sign and significance of the coefficients are similar if we use other vulnerability indices and even the same if project concepts and full proposals are analyzed separately (see Supplementary Material, Table 4 ).
Conclusions
This paper has examined which equity and cost-effectiveness indicators could be used for selecting projects in multilateral adaptation funding and whether there are synergies or trade-offs between equity and cost-effectiveness. The theoretical analysis has been complemented by analyzing 39 project documents from the Adaptation Fund (AF) as major multilateral funding institution.
First of all, we have found it quite challenging to define equity and cost-effectiveness indicators, as neither the academic literature nor the policy documents give clear guidance. We have selected three indicators for each principle that corresponds to both concepts in the literature (e.g. equality and leximin for equity; monetary and non-monetary benefits for cost-effectiveness) and to the scarce AF policy guidance (support for the most vulnerable; social, economic, and environmental benefits). As equity indicators, we chose vulnerability, income level as proxy for poverty and number of beneficiaries per USD as proxy for equal funding per capita. The cost-effectiveness indicators selected were absolute and relative economic savings as well as human lives saved, all per USD of funding, When applying these indicators to 39 AF projects, we find that the AFB has rather approved projects from high-income and less vulnerable countries with high absolute economic savings, while not approving projects in poor, vulnerable countries with high relative economic savings. These patterns are clearly in contradiction with the final goal of the AFB to mainly support countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. One possible interpretation is that vulnerable and less-affluent countries may have less capacity to develop advanced project proposals. It has to be noted that data constraints forced us to look at country level indicators, while we were not able to assess vulnerability at the community level, as demanded by the AFB project review criteria. Future analysis will have to address both the country and the community/project level. Furthermore, we cannot guarantee that our assessment is valid beyond the particular indicators selected and analyzed. This is a particularly relevant limitation as neither negotiators at the UNFCCC level nor the AFB has been able to agree on a set of indicators.
Regarding the relationship between equity and cost-effectiveness, our results show that there is not necessarily a trade-off between the two, which can both be supported by theory and empirical data. From a theoretical point of view, we can argue that only a pure economic indicator for cost-effectiveness tends to be in contradiction with major equity principles, as high absolute economic benefits mostly occur in affluent countries and regions that are rather less vulnerable, 22 while other cost-effectiveness indicators based on human lives and relative economic measures are more compatible with equity principles, such as the leximin principle. If the definition of cost-effectiveness is simply to achieve a specific equity measure (e.g. reducing vulnerability of the poorest) at least costs, we would even see almost perfect synergies. Our ideas are supported by the data on the 39 analyzed Adaptation Fund project proposals: while absolute economic savings are negatively correlated with vulnerability, poverty, and number of beneficiaries, the relative economic measure, which is theoretically closer to vulnerability, is positively correlated with all of these three equity indicators.
Our results clearly have some limitations: first of all, we analyzed three easily understandable equity and cost-effectiveness indicators, which implied simplifications, neglecting of potentially relevant indicators and also value judgments. Therefore, it may be warranted to test the stability of our results by applying other or refined indicators for equity and cost-effectiveness, while also analyzing further goals of adaptation finance (e.g. legitimacy). Furthermore, we only applied our framework to 39 AFB project proposals. It would be interesting to see if the observed results are also valid beyond the AFB, including other bilateral and multilateral channels. As last limitation, the data availability and quality involve uncertainty, particularly on the cost-effectiveness side where our analysis relied on data from project documents. Improving data quality would require elaboration of methodologies on how to measure the mentioned (or other) indicators, and verification of collected data as project proponents may have an interest in exaggerating benefits of their projects.
What do our results imply for the operations of the AFB? First of all, the AFB may have to elaborate more detailed criteria for the technical review, as already considered (see AFB 2011a), provide additional guidance to implementing entities on how to show compliance with these criteria, and make public the reason for the final decision. While this may not have been very relevant in the past given the availability of sufficient funding, the AFB may have to be more selective in allocation of funding in the future (e.g. in the context of the 50 % cap of funding to Multilateral Implementing Entities). Second, if past approval decisions are related to the capacity of countries and implementing entities to develop well-written proposals, then capacity development for particularly vulnerable countries and their implementing entities, including support for collection of relevant data, may be as important as deciding on concrete review and allocation criteria.
